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1 AST-D : ambiguous scenarios test relevant to depre
2 Cognitive bias modiﬁcationThe tendency to interpret ambiguous everyday situations in a relatively negative manner (negative
interpretation bias) is central to cognitive models of depression. Limited tools are available to measure
this bias, either experimentally or in the clinic. This study aimed to develop a pragmatic interpretation
bias measure using an ambiguous scenarios test relevant to depressed mood (the AST-D).1 In Study 1,
after a pilot phase (N = 53), the AST-D was presented via a web-based survey (N = 208). Participants imag-
ined and rated each AST-D ambiguous scenario. As predicted, higher dysphoric mood was associated with
lower pleasantness ratings (more negative bias), independent of mental imagery measures. In Study 2, self-
report ratings were compared with objective ratings of participants’ imagined outcomes of the ambiguous
scenarios (N = 41). Data were collected in the experimental context of a functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging scanner. Consistent with subjective bias scores, independent judges rated more sentences as neg-
atively valenced for the high versus low dysphoric group. Overall, results suggest the potential utility of the
AST-D in assessing interpretation bias associated with depressed mood.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Biased information processing is an important marker of nega-
tive mood, and contributes to the development of depression and
anxiety disorders (Mathews & Macleod, 2005). A negative interpre-
tation bias refers to the attribution of a negative compared to a be-
nign or positive meaning to an ambiguous situation (Butler &
Mathews, 1983); it is relative, and considering a lack of positive
interpretation bias is also of interest. Negative interpretation bias
has been associated with clinical depression and depressed mood
(dysphoria) (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Lawson, MacLeod, &
Hammond, 2002; Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003).
Cognitive models of depression suggest that negative interpreta-
tion bias – seeing one’s glass as perpetually half empty rather than
half full – is critical to the maintenance of depressed mood (Beck,
1976). Promoting a less negative interpretation bias is an impor-
tant component of successful cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)
for depression (Hollon et al. 2005).
CBM2 techniques have recently been developed to target such
negative biases directly via computer-based training rather thanY license. 
Department of Psychiatry,
m, Tel.: +44 01865 226 487;
ssed moodface-to-face therapy (MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). For positive
CBM interpretation bias (CBM-I), participants are trained to resolve
situations that initially appear ambiguous in a benign/positive rather
than negative way. CBM-I was initially developed in the context of
anxiety disorders (e.g. Grey & Mathews, 2000; Mathews & Mackin-
tosh, 2000). A CBM-I procedure emphasising the use of mental imag-
ery to simulate scenarios, has been developed to reduce vulnerability
to depressed mood (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, Lang, &
Shah, 2009).
Experiments and treatments designed to modify interpretation
bias would clearly beneﬁt from tools to measure it. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, the choice is currently limited; the measures include a
physiological test – measuring the magnitude of blink reﬂex (from
a puff of air to the eye) in response to ambiguous stimuli (Lawson
et al. 2002) – and a behavioral test such as the Scrambled Sen-
tences Task (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Pennebaker, 1993). In the latter,
participants are asked to make a sentence from a mixed sequence
of words (under a cognitive load and constrained time). The words
allow for ‘unscrambling’ into either a negative or positive sentence,
thus providing an indication of bias. Such interpretation bias tests
are not easy to administer and score. Other variants have not been
submitted to basic scrutiny to determine whether they assess a
bias relevant to dysphoria or depression (MacLeod et al. 2009). A
more pragmatic measure for future use in clinical settings includes
an ambiguous scenarios test (AST) in which participants are simply
required to rate a series of descriptions (e.g. Holmes & Mathews,
2005; Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006; Hoppitt,
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AST used recognition ratings and required a somewhat complex
computation of a bias score (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).
Replacing the recognition task with pleasantness ratings on a 9-
point Likert scale simpliﬁed this (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Fur-
ther, to maximise impact, participants were encouraged to simu-
late the scenarios using mental imagery to resolve ambiguity
(Holmes, Lang, & Shah 2009; Hoppitt et al. 2010). For example,
one item read ‘‘You are watching the lottery results on TV. As the
numbers are called you ﬁnd out your result’’. A positive interpreta-
tion would include winning and a negative interpretation, losing.
Higher pleasantness ratings indicate a more positive interpretation
bias. Since ASTs were initially developed for anxiety such a mea-
sure required modiﬁcation to be valid in the context of depressed
mood.
Our goal in the two studies presented here was to develop an
AST measure of interpretation bias by adapting the scenario con-
tent for depressed mood (AST-D1). In line with Holmes, Lang, &
Shah (2009), explicit instructions to imagine the ambiguous situa-
tions were included. We predicted that compared to low dyspho-
rics (i.e. people with low levels of depressed mood), high
dysphorics (people with high levels of depressed mood) would
have a more negative bias on the AST-D (Study 1) as indicated by
lower subjective pleasantness ratings. Further, we predicted that
participants’ subjective ratings would be corroborated by indepen-
dent raters’ judgments of written descriptions of the imagined sce-
narios (Study 2).2. Study 1: Comparison of the ambiguous scenarios test in high
versus low dysphorics
2.1. Overview
A 24-item AST-D was derived from a brief pilot study of 55
scenarios (N = 53). The AST-D was then presented in a web-based
format (N = 208). Participants were instructed to imagine the out-
come of each of the ambiguous scenarios, and to rate the pleasant-
ness for each. To check whether differences in imagination were
inﬂuencing the results, measures of mental imagery (vividness
for the AST-D items and the tendency to use mental imagery in
everyday life) were included. We predicted that the pleasantness
scores on the AST-D would be negatively correlated with Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) scores
independent of the mental imagery measures.3. Method
3.1. Pilot phase: AST-D item development
A pilot set of 55 items was derived from the 20-item AST used
previously by Holmes and Mathews (2005), and Holmes et al.
(2006) by adding 35 further depression-relevant items. People
with clinical and research experience in depression devised the
items. An example of a new scenario was ‘‘You wake up, get out
of bed, stretch and really notice how you feel today.’’ This item
could be interpreted either positively (e.g. they imagine feeling
energetic), or negatively (e.g. they imagine feeling lethargic). A pi-
lot study presented online these 55 scenarios to 53 participants (30
females, 78% aged between 18–34) whose BDI-II scores were re-
corded simultaneously. The participants with the 25% highest
BDI-II (M = 14.75, SD = 4.39) and 25% lowest BDI-II (M = 0.33,
SD = 0.65) scores were identiﬁed. For each scenario, the mean
pleasantness ratings of the two groups were compared, choosing
the 24 items showing largest effects. Thus, piloting reduced theinitial 55-item set to 24 items, forming the AST-D (Appendix A)
used in the current study.
3.2. Participants
E-mail invitations to university students allowed us to recruit
208 participants (136 females; mean age = 22.49 years,
SD = 5.02). Participants had the opportunity to enter a cash prize
draw of £100. This study, complying with the Ethical Recommen-
dations of the British Psychological Society for online studies, re-
ceived approval from the University of Oxford ethical board.
Two groups were generated according to the participants’
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory BDI-II Cut-offs of BDI-
IIP 14 (high dysphorics, N = 70) and of BDI-II 6 6 (low dysphorics,
N = 74) were chosen in line with previous research in this area (e.g.
Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008; Moulds & Kandris, 2006).
3.3. Procedure
Bristol Online Survey (2007) software was used to create the
web-based survey. Participants gave informed consent online be-
fore beginning the questionnaires.
3.4. Measures
3.4.1. AST-D
The 24 ambiguous scenarios were presented individually, fol-
lowed by ratings e.g. ‘‘It’s New Year’s Eve. You think about the year
ahead of you’’ (Appendix A). Participants were instructed to: ‘‘Form
a mental image of each of the scenarios. Imagine each scenario
happening to you personally. Follow the ﬁrst image that comes
to mind, don’t think too much about each one. Then rate how
pleasant your image is, as well as how vivid it is.’’ The pleasantness
rating was given on a 9-point Likert scale anchored from extremely
unpleasant to extremely pleasant. The vividness rating was made on
a 7-point Likert scale anchored from not vivid at all to extremely vi-
vid. While the term ‘pleasantness rating’ is used henceforth, it does
not simply refer to a ‘pleasant meaning positive’ dimension since
its range extends from negative (extremely unpleasant) to positive
(extremely pleasant).
3.4.2. Spontaneous use of Imagery scale (SUIS;Reisberg, Pearson, &
Kosslyn, 2003).
The SUIS is a 12-itemmeasure of the tendency to use imagery in
everyday situations. Each item (e.g. ‘‘When I think about a series of
errands I must do, I visualize the stores I will visit’’) is rated on a 5-
point Likert scale anchored at each point from (1) ‘‘the description
is. . . never appropriate’’ to (5) ‘‘. . . always completely appropriate’’.
BDI-II (Beck et al. 1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report
questionnaire assessing symptoms of depression with good psy-
chometric properties: the internal consistency is .93 with college
students and .92 with psychiatric outpatients.4. Results
4.1. Psychometric properties of the AST-D
Internal consistency was examined through reliability analysis.
The AST-D had a Cronbach’s a of .82, indicating a good level of
internal consistency (Barker, Pistrang, & Eliott, 1996). The cor-
rected item-total correlations had a mean of .37. The pleasantness
ratings of the scenarios were normally distributed (Shapiro–Wilk
test: W = 0.995, p = .78). There was no signiﬁcant difference in
pleasantness ratings between men and women, t(206) = 0.96,
p = .34, and no signiﬁcant correlation with age (rs = .03, p = .63).
Table 1
Means and standard deviations for mood, bias and imagery scores of the high and low dysphoric groups in Study 1.
High dysphoric (N = 70) Low dysphoric (N = 74)
M SD M SD
Age 21.67 4.98 22.77 5.22
Gender ratio (M:F) 17:53 27:47
BDI-II 22.19 8.49 3.55 1.79
Interpretation bias – AST-D pleasantness ratings 5.03 0.76 5.84 0.86
Vividness of AST-D scenarios 4.74 0.87 4.70 0.81
SUIS 3.56 0.57 3.31 0.52
Note. BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; SUIS, Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale; High dysphoric, BDI-IIP 14; Low dysphoric, BDI-II 6 6; AST-
D, ambiguous scenarios test for dysphoria.
3 Functional Magenetic Resonance Imaging
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As predicted, participants’ pleasantness ratings correlated neg-
atively and signiﬁcantly with their BDI-II score, r(206) = .48,
p < .001. Thus increased dysphoria was associated with a more
negative interpretation bias. Partial correlations showed that when
controlling for SUIS, the correlation remained signiﬁcant
r(205) = .47, p < .001, as when controlling for AST-D vividness
r(205) = .51, p < .001. The range of BDI-II scores was 0–54.
4.3. A Comparison of high versus low dysphorics
The high and low dysphoric groups did not differ signiﬁcantly in
age, t(142) = 1.29, p = .20 or gender, v2(1, N = 144) = 2.51, p = .11,
see Table 1.
AST-D pleasantness ratings were compared between high and
low dysphoric groups using independent samples t-tests. As pre-
dicted, the low dysphoric group rated the scenarios as signiﬁcantly
less pleasant than the high dysphoric group, t(142) = 5.95, p < .001,
d = 0.99, suggesting a more negative interpretation bias.
The vividness ratings for the AST-D items were not signiﬁcantly
different between the two groups, t(142) = 0.32, p = .75. The high
dysphoric group reported greater spontaneous use of mental imag-
ery in everyday life, as measured by the SUIS, t(142) = 2.83,
p = .005, d = 0.46.
5. Discussion
These results provide initial support for a simple to administer
AST-D as an index of interpretation bias in depressed mood. Using
a web-based study, the AST-D demonstrated good consistency in a
population of students. The pleasantness ratings on this measure
were negatively correlated with depressed mood (BDI-II), as would
be predicted by the presence of a negative interpretation bias. This
correlation was independent of vividness of the imagination of the
AST-D scenarios, and of tendency to use mental imagery. Further,
as predicted, high and low dysphoric groups differed signiﬁcantly
on the AST-D pleasantness ratings.
Although not key to our hypotheses, one unexpected ﬁnding
was the higher SUIS scores in the high dysphoric group (Table 1).
It is possible that such scores might reﬂect the presence of intru-
sive negative imagery – a feature of increasing research interest
(Patel et al. 2007; Williams & Moulds, 2007). However, the mean
values show only a modest difference and future research is
needed to test replicability and further hypotheses about imagery
in depression (Holmes , Lang & Deeprose, 2009).
It could be argued that since all ratings were subjective, the re-
sults may merely represent an anhedonic response. That is, dys-
phoric participants might subjectively experience less positive
emotion in response to the imagery, rather than producing a more
negative interpretation of the ambiguous stimuli per se. Partici-
pants’ actual interpretations were not recorded in this web-basedstudy. Study 2 meant to address this issue by eliciting written
descriptions of ambiguous scenarios’ imagined outcomes and
using independent judges to rate these.
5.1. Study 2: Independent assessment of the resolved AST-D scenario
descriptions in an fMRI3 setting
5.1.1. Overview
Written descriptions of the ambiguous scenarios’ imagined out-
comes were elicited so that interpretation bias could be rated both
subjectively (as in Study 1) and by independent raters. The AST-D
was presented in an experimental context – an fMRI scanning
study, consistent with the aim to develop a tool to be used in a
variety of settings. We predicted that the number of scenarios
the judges rated negatively would correlate negatively with partic-
ipants’ pleasantness ratings on the AST-D. Further, it was expected
that more descriptions from high dysphoric participants would be
objectively categorized as negative compared to descriptions from
low dysphorics.6. Method
6.1. Participants
Forty-one participants gave written informed consent (19 fe-
males, mean age 24.69 years, SD = 5.20). Participants were re-
cruited through advertisements for an fMRI study on university
mailing lists. The Oxfordshire Research Ethics Committee approved
this study. Participants were divided into high and low dysphoric
groups according to their scores on the BDI-II, as in Study 1.
6.2. Measures
BDI-II (Beck et al. 1996). The BDI-II served as a measure of de-
pressed mood.
AST-D. In addition to giving pleasantness ratings (measure of
interpretation bias described in Study 1), participants described the
scenarios’ imagined outcomes after coming out of the scanner. Viv-
idness ratings were not included. Further details are given below.
6.3. Procedure
Participants were instructed to imagine the ambiguous scenar-
ios as in Study 1. They were asked to remember each imagined out-
come, in order to describe them once out of the scanner (technical
limitations render this impossible during scanning). The scenarios
were projected on a screen visible from the fMRI scanner (white
characters, black background). Each scenario was split between
two slides, the ﬁrst presenting the context and the second contain-
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Slide 2: You think about the year ahead of you.’’). Slide 1 was dis-
played for 3–8s. according to the length of the text, slide 2 was al-
ways presented for 10s. allowing time to imagine the outcome.
Participants also underwent a separate heat-perception task as
part of a separate study described elsewhere (Berna, 2010).
After imagining each scenario, participants rated its pleasant-
ness using a 2-button response device that moved a cursor contin-
uously along a visual analogue scale presented on the screen,
anchored from extremely unpleasant to extremely pleasant. After
exiting the scanner, participants described each of the imagined
outcomes on a sheet with the AST-D items.
Two independent raters (psychology researchers), blind to BDI-
II scores, classiﬁed each of the 24 descriptions for each participant
(N = 984 descriptions) into one of three categories: negative, neu-
tral/unclear or positive. Inter-rater reliability between the ﬁrst and
the second judge was good (91%) (Barker et al. 1996). A third rater
assessed cases of disagreement (N = 88). The majority answer was
chosen. When all three raters disagreed, the scenario’s valence was
considered unclear (N = 6). For each participant, a sum score of each
of the negative, positive and neutral/unclear categories was com-
puted separately.7. Results
7.1. Subjective pleasantness ratings
As predicted, there was a signiﬁcant negative correlation be-
tween depressed mood (BDI-II) and subjective pleasantness rat-
ings, r(40) = .56, p < .001. Further, compared to the low
dysphoric group, the high dysphoric group rated their scenarios
as less pleasant t(31) = 4.29, p = <.001, d = 1.6 (see Table 2).7.2. Independent ratings
The mean number of descriptions in each valence category is
shown in Table 2. Example resolutions for the item ‘‘It’s New Year’s
Eve. You think about the year ahead of you’’ are: ‘‘It will be hard
work, like this year, which I don’t look forward to’’ (negative va-
lence); and ‘‘I’m excited and happy’’ (positive valence). BDI-II
scores were signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of scenarios
the independent judges rated as positive, r(41) = .63, p < .001, as
well as with the number of scenarios rated as negative,
r(41) = .53, p < .001, but not with the scenarios rated as neutral/un-
clear, r(41) = .17, p = 0.29.
The high dysphoric group’s scenarios were judged signiﬁcantly
more often as negative, t(31) = 3.29, p = .002, d = 1.24,, than those
of the low dysphoric group, and signiﬁcantly less often as positive,Table 2
Means and standard deviations for mood and bias scores (both subjective a
High dysphoric (N
M
Age 21.10
Gender ratio (M:F) 5:5
BDI-II 22.70
AST-D pleasantness ratings (subjective) 4.84
Independent ratings
Number of scenarios rated as
Positive 6.70
Negative 10.70
Neutral/unclear 5.20
Note. BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; High dysphoric, BDI-IIP 14; Lot(31) = 3.77, p = .001, d = 1.43, with no signiﬁcant difference for the
neutral category, t(31) = 0.77, p = .45.
7.3. Correlation between subjective and independent ratings
The subjective pleasantness ratings were signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with the objective ratings for the negative category,
r(41) = .60, p < 0.001, the positive category, r(41) = .70, p < 0.001,
but not the neutral category r(41) = .09, p = 0.59.
8. Discussion
Participants’ subjective AST-D ratings during fMRI scanning
replicated ﬁndings from Study 1: depressed mood was associated
with lower pleasantness ratings indicative of a more negative
interpretation bias. Importantly, subjective and objective ratings
showed good correspondence. Compared to those of low dyspho-
rics, the descriptions of resolved ambiguous scenarios made by
high dysphorics of resolved ambiguous scenarios were judged to
be more often negative in content. This is consistent with the
AST-D indexing a negative bias in interpretation rather than simply
anhedonia.
9. General discussion
Our objective was a readily useable measure of interpretation
bias relevant to dysphoria: the 24-item AST-D. In Study 1, the
AST-D showed good internal consistency, correlated with de-
pressed mood (BDI-II), and distinguished high versus low dyspho-
rics. Findings were not explained by a lack of vividness in
imagining the items or by a difference in tendency to use mental
imagery in the high dysphoric group.
In Study 2, objective ratings conﬁrmed that the descriptions of
ambiguous scenarios imagined by a high compared to low dys-
phoric group were more negative in content. This is consistent
with AST-D differences not merely being due to diminished posi-
tive affect for the same scenario outcome, but to differing interpre-
tations of the outcome itself. Overall, the AST-D shows promise as a
tool to assess interpretation biases for CBT treatment monitoring,
experimental research such as CBM-I paradigms (e.g. Blackwell &
Holmes, 2010) and during fMRI studies on similar topics (e.g.
Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010).
These studies have a number of limitations. For example, they
were conducted on non-clinical samples of students, and validat-
ing the AST-D in a general population as well as a clinical sample
would be useful. In Study 2, time passed between the imagination
and description of the scenarios. While this may have introduced
extra variablity and weakened the results, a convergence between
objective and subjective ratings was still found. Successful use ofnd objective) of the high and low dysphoric groups in Study 2.
= 10) Low dysphoric (N = 23)
SD M SD
2.96 25.30 3.96
13:10
4.40 2.74 2.30
0.60 5.75 0.56
3.09 11.09 3.06
3.16 6.83 3.08
1.99 4.48 2.64
w dysphoric, BDI-II 6 6.
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applicability. Finally, since some research suggests that lack of pos-
itivity bias is not the same as a negativity bias and there are differ-
ent correlates, albeit in a different information processing
framework (e.g. Hayden, Klein, Durbin, & Olino, 2006), further re-
search might seek to develop versions of the AST-D, which could
test this possibility.
Overall, results suggest the potential utility of the AST-D as a
simple and thus pragmatic tool to assess interpretation bias asso-
ciated with depressed mood. Depression and anxiety are highly
comorbid and the relation between the two was beyond the scope
of the current study but may be of interest in future studies. Since
negative interpretation bias is central to cognitive models of
depression, and measures are currently lacking both experimen-
tally and in the clinic, the development of tools such as the AST-
D is in high demand.
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The 24 ambigsuous scenarios of the AST-D
Your partner asks you to buy a present for their sister’s
birthday, as they are busy. When the sister opens it, her
face shows you how she feels.
Your best friend convinces you to go on a blind date and as
you sit in the bar waiting to meet your date, you think
about how it will go.
You give a speech at your friend’s wedding. When you have
ﬁnished, you observe the audience’s reaction.
You wake up, get out of bed, stretch and really notice how you
feel today.
You go to a place you visited as a child. Walking aroundmakes
you feel emotional.
You are about to move with your partner into a new home.
You think about living there.
You are going to see your sister in her school play. You’ve left
it to the last minute to get there. As you drive up to the
school and see the parking bays you anticipate the time it
will take you to arrive.
You are lost in a part of a big city you don’t knowwell. You ask
someone on the streets for directions when they pull out
something from their pocket.
You join a tennis club and before long you are asked to play in
a doubles match. It’s a tough match and afterwards you
discuss your performance with your partner.
You have recently taken an important exam. Your results
arrive with an unexpected letter of explanation about your
grade.
As you walk into the interview room the panel of interviewers
welcomes you and proceeds to ask some tough questions.Appendix A (continued)
By the end of the interview you know what the outcome is.
You are starting a new job that you very much want. You
think about what it will be like.
You go to a wedding where you know very few other guests.
After the party, you reﬂect on how the other guests
behaved.
You are organizing the annual ofﬁce party on a small budget.
On the night of the party, you look around to see if people
are enjoying themselves.
You are going to see a very good friend at the station. You
haven’t seen them for years. You feel emotional, thinking
about how much they might have changed.
It’s New Year ’s Eve. You think about the year ahead of you.
You are in a reﬂective mood and think back at past
achievements and disappointments that you have
experienced during your life. Overall, your main feelings
about your life so far emerge.
It is an overcast day and you are sitting on the beach. You look
up to notice the weather really beginning to change.
Your neighbours have just had a new baby. You hear it crying.
Through the window you see how the husband holds it.
You are camping in a forest and are very cold. You decide to
light a ﬁre. The ﬂames grow in intensity much faster than
you imagined.
Your friend is very keen on skating and persuades you to try it
out. At the rink you put on the skates and step on the ice.
You glide forward, slowly at ﬁrst, then faster.
At the company you are working for there have been big cut
backs. One day you are called into see your boss. When you
enter the room, the boss’s face is tired.
You are interested in a job, but think you might be under-
qualiﬁed and so ask for details. When you speak to the
people, you realize what your chances are to get the job.
Some important people are visiting the ofﬁce and you are
asked at the last minute to present a project to them.
Afterwards, you get feedback on your performance.References
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